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Abstract
This study investigates the impact of World Bank development policy lending on the qual-
ity of economic policy. It finds that the quality of policy increases, but at a diminishing
rate, with the cumulative number of policy loans. Similar results hold for the cumulative
number of conditions attached to policy loans, although quadratic specifications indicate
that additional conditions may even reduce the quality of policy beyond some point. The
paper measures the quality of economic policy using the World Bank’s Country Policy
and Institutional Assessments of macro, debt, fiscal and structural policies, and considers
only policy loans targeted at improvements in those areas. Previous studies finding weaker
effects of policy lending on macro stability have failed to distinguish loans primarily in-
tended to improve economic policy from other loans targeted at improvements in sector
policies or in public management. The paper also shows that investing in economic policy
does not “crowd out” policy improvements in other areas such as public sector governance
or human development. The results are robust to using alternative indicators of policy
quality and correcting for endogeneity with system generalized methods of moments and
cross-sectional two-stage least squares. The more positive results in the study relative to
some previous studies are consistent with claims by the World Bank that it has learned
from its mistakes with traditional adjustment lending.
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1. Introduction
Since 1980 the World Bank has been providing conditional financing to recipient gov-
ernments to support specific policy and institutional reforms. These development policy
loans (DPLs) – formerly known as structural adjustment lending (SAL) – have become
an important component in the financing of development operations. For instance, in
fiscal year 2008 they accounted for 6.6 billion USD or 27 percent of total World Bank
commitments.
Not surprisingly, there exists a vast literature evaluating the effects of adjustment lend-
ing. However, no clear consensus view emerges from this research as some studies find a
positive effect of adjustment lending on growth and macroeconomic policies, while others
indicate that policy lending failed to induce change with no significant impact on growth.
The lack of consensus is in part due to methodological challenges encountered in exam-
ining the effectiveness of policy lending. This study investigates the impact of World Bank
lending on the quality of policy, addressing three particular methodological concerns.
First, there is a potential selection bias problem. Countries often receive policy loans
because of policy deficiencies, so the coefficient on policy lending may be biased downward
when examining its impact on policy outcomes (Easterly, 2005). On the other hand,
the coefficient may be biased upward, if loans tend to go to motivated governments that
would have reformed even in the absence of support. Hence, estimating the impact of
development policy lending calls for a robust identification strategy, which we implement
with instrumental variable estimation and system GMM.
Second, it is important to select appropriate dependent variables. World Bank loans
seek to improve policy in many different sectors or sub-sectors (see the corresponding table
in the online appendix of this journal), and the estimated impacts of lending may be biased
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downward if the outcome variable is not matched with the relevant subset of policy loans.
In contrast with much of the existing literature on DPL effectiveness, we adjust for the
policy target of World Bank lending. For example, Easterly (2005) acknowledges that
his study is limited to ‘easily quantifiable [objective] macroeconomic indicators’ and that
DPLs also target other policy improvements, such as reform of inefficient financial sectors.
Third, as theory provides little insight on how development policy lending affects policy
quality, we also examine potential scale effects. Specifically, we test different functional
forms that allow for increasing or decreasing returns to additional loans (or conditions).
Another possible explanation for the divergent findings in the literature is the time
period under investigation. Most studies evaluate the first two decades of adjustment
lending. At that time, the contracts offered implied a policy of ex-ante, donor-driven
lending.1 Given the shortcomings of this approach, the World Bank modified its policy
towards adjustment lending around the turn of the millennium. The more positive results
of the few (internal) reviews evaluating recent episodes of adjustment lending could indicate
an improved effectiveness of policy support. However, as a robust econometric study is
still lacking, this paper aims to fill this gap by investigating the period 1995-2008.
Results from panel estimations show that the number of DPLs has a positive but dimin-
ishing effect on the quality of economic policy. This finding is robust to sample restrictions,
additional controls, the use of alternative indicators of policy quality, and correction for
endogeneity with system GMM. Further evidence is provided by instrumenting our variable
of interest – the number of cumulative economic policy loans – in a cross-sectional setting.
Similar results are obtained when we substitute the number of cumulative conditions for
the number of DPLs as the key regressor, although here it is less clear which functional
form best fits the data.
We further test whether implementation of economic policy loans “crowds out” policy
improvements in other, non-targeted policy areas. Conceivably, improving policy in one
3
sector or sub-sector might divert rent-seeking efforts to other sectors. However, we find no
evidence in our tests that investing in economic policy significantly affects policy quality
in other areas such as public sector governance or social sector and environmental policies.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we present
a brief history of World Bank policy lending and review the related literature. Section
3 describes the data and methodological issues. Section 4 presents the empirical results.
In that section, we first discuss findings from the panel estimations using the number of
cumulative loans and the number of cumulative conditions as key variables of interest. For
both variables, we test linear, quadratic and logarithmic model specifications. Next, we
show that our main results are robust to sample restrictions, additional controls and the
use of alternative indicators of policy quality. In subsection 4.3, we address endogeneity
concerns and discuss the results from system GMM and cross-sectional 2SLS. Finally,
section 5 concludes.
2. Background
In 1980 the World Bank launched its first non-project lending instrument to support
policy change in recipient countries. At that time, top management was dissatisfied with
the limited influence of the Bank’s normal project lending on policies of borrowing govern-
ments. Therefore structural adjustment lending was conceived, as a new lending program
with which the Bank would try to help countries to tackle important policy deficiencies.
The programs provided conditional finance in support of specific policy reforms. In its
early years adjustment lending mainly emphasized economic stabilization and correction
of balance of payments distortions. At the beginning of the 1990s more emphasis was put
on protecting the poor from the adverse effects of the adjustment programs. The contracts
that were offered implied a policy of ex-ante, donor-driven lending (Kapur et al., 1997).
However, as the introduction of structural adjustment lending (SAL) generated concerns
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from within the Bank and from borrowing countries (World Bank, 1989),2 several studies
investigated its effectiveness. Internal World Bank reviews indicated that early adjustment
lending produced mixed results. For instance, comparing program with non-program coun-
tries in a before-after analysis, World Bank (1989) found that policy lending stimulated
growth and balance of payments performance. Interestingly, results of this exercise were
more favorable when intensive program countries – that is, countries that received three or
more adjustment loans – were compared with non-program countries. However, the study
also noted that target countries had not been able to grow out of debt (as envisioned)
and questioned the sustainability of reforms. Taking a sectoral approach, Jayarajah and
Branson (1995) analyzed the effectiveness of SAL using evaluation audits and project com-
pletion reports for 99 adjustment operations, covering the period 1980-1992. Again, mixed
results were found; for example, only 24 of the 40 countries that received macroeconomic
adjustment loans were able to reduce fiscal deficits and bring down inflation.
In addition to those internal evaluations, external research also examined the perfor-
mance of adjustment lending. Two early studies include Mosley et al. (1991) and Kil-
lick et al. (1998). Using various methodologies – comparing program and non-program
countries, regression analysis and model simulations – Mosley et al. (1991) found that
development policy operations were instrumental in strengthening export and balance of
payments performance, but had little impact on economic growth. The authors also found
that adjustment programs were associated with reduced investment. Based on a review of
the literature, Killick et al. (1998) provide further evidence that early adjustment lending
produced mixed outcomes. More recent studies corroborating this conclusion include Bird
and Rowlands (2001), Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2005), Easterly (2005) and Agostino
(2008). Bird and Rowlands (2001) investigate whether World Bank policy lending serves
as a (positive) signal to lenders and investors. The authors attempt to correct for endo-
geneity by employing lagged values of their main independent variables. Using a panel of
5
93 developing countries that runs from 1984 to 1995, they fail to find any consistent posi-
tive effect of adjustment lending on other financial flows such as FDI, portfolio or private
debt. Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2005) use several regression techniques to estimate the
effect of World Bank adjustment lending on long-run GDP per capita growth for the pe-
riod 1970-1999, correcting for endogeneity using lagged values and employing 3SLS. They
conclude that World Bank lending stimulates growth in some instances, particularly in low
income countries and poor democracies. In an influential paper, Easterly (2005) consid-
ers the repetition of adjustment lending to the same country as a means of reducing the
selection bias problem. The author estimates a pooled probit regression over the period
1980-1999 with an extreme macroeconomic imbalance indicator as his dependent variable.
Results fail to show any consistent positive effect of adjustment lending on macroeconomic
stability. Additionally, Easterly (2005) examines the effect of repeated lending on growth
in a cross-sectional 2SLS regression, but, again, without any significant results. Finally,
based on the Heckman (1979) selection model, Agostino (2008) investigates whether sign-
ing a loan agreement has an impact on private investment. Covering the period 1982-1999,
the author finds that entering into SAL has a negative effect on investment.
The mixed track record of early adjustment lending can be attributed at least in part
to the limited enforceability of reform conditions (see, for example, Svensson, 2000, 2003).
That is, when contracting for policy reform an independent arbitrator – an international
court of law – is lacking to punish any player who breaks contract stipulations. If a
recipient government cannot commit to contract conditions, the incentives provided in
the (ex-ante) contract will no longer guarantee effective policy reform. A second reason
for the mixed performance of SAL is poor program design and ill-chosen policies (Killick
et al., 1998; Rodrik, 1990, 2008).3 For instance, Rodrik (1990) argues that a focus on
liberalization is misguided if macroeconomic stability would thereby be endangered. A
third reason mentioned in the literature is limited sustainability and backsliding of reforms
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after implementation (World Bank, 1989; Rodrik, 1992; Collier et al., 1997). For example,
World Bank (1989) indicates that many highly indebted African countries failed to maintain
fiscal discipline after initial reductions in budget deficits.
Recognizing the limitations of traditional policy-based support, the World Bank modi-
fied its approach towards adjustment lending (and development assistance) around the turn
of the millennium.4 Among other changes, it reduced the average number of conditions
in its loans, strengthened country “ownership” of lending programs by using countries’
own development strategies to identify loan conditions, and moved from ex-ante towards
ex-post disbursement of loan tranches (Koeberle, 2003; World Bank, 2004, 2006).5
Surprisingly, and in contrast to the extensive research evaluating the first two decades
of adjustment lending, there is not much systematic research investigating more recent
episodes of policy based lending. We found only a few internal reviews.6 The World
Bank’s 2003 Annual Review of Development Effectiveness was dedicated to analyzing the
effectiveness of Bank support for policy reform. Focusing on the period 1999-2003, the
study concluded that ‘Bank lending was concentrated in countries that were improving
their policies’ and that ‘in many cases’ DPLs and other Bank support ‘contributed to policy
improvements’ (World Bank, 2004). Also, beginning in 2006 the World Bank provides a
three-yearly retrospective of its experience with the implementation of DPLs. Overall,
DPLs are evaluated favorably. For instance, comparing results to objectives, the 2009
DPL retrospective argues that DPLs have consistently achieved development outcomes
during the period 2006-2009 (World Bank, 2009). Finally, a review of Bank support in
fragile and conflict-affected states reports a positive and statistically significant correlation
between policy improvements and the number of years under DPL support (IEG, 2013).
However, a quantitative study with a more robust identification strategy is still lacking.
We aim to fill this gap by investigating the association of repeated policy lending with the
quality of policy, covering the period 1995-2008. Following Easterly (2005), we focus on
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repeated lending since we believe supporting policy reform is a multistage and long term
process (see, for example, Pritchett and de Weijer, 2010). Our dependent variable is
not a final outcome measure such as economic growth or FDI, but rather policy quality.
In this choice, we are guided by Roodman (2007), who argues that development aid is
probably only a weak signal in the noisy and limited data available on economic growth
in developing countries. Rather than testing directly for effects on growth, we test for
whether World Bank country teams achieve their objective in designing DPLs of improving
the quality of development policies. In this respect our study is related to Boockmann
and Dreher (2003) and Kilby (2005), who both investigate the impact of World Bank
lending on the policies developing countries select, as measured by the Fraser Institute’s
“Economic Freedom” index or components thereof. However, our study differs in a number
of important ways from Boockmann and Dreher (2003) and Kilby (2005). For instance,
Boockmann and Dreher (2003) investigate the impact of World Bank aid and IMF credits
over the period 1970-1997, while our study investigates a more recent time frame. In their
research, Boockmann and Dreher (2003) use a broader set of loans, including projects as
well as adjustment loans that might be targeted at other policies. Furthermore, they do not
explicitly address endogeneity concerns, although they do report some results using GMM.
Similarly, Kilby (2005) looks at an early period, 1970-2000, and estimates the (potentially)
endogenous effect of World Bank lending and aggregated non-Bank aid flows.7 Moreover,
Kilby (2005) considers only one aspect of economic policy, deregulation.8
3. Data and Methodology
3.1. Dependent variable and variables of interest
In this study we analyze the association of World Bank lending with the quality of
economic policy. In contrast with most of the existing literature on policy lending, our
dependent variable is not a final outcome measure but rather the quality of economic man-
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agement, as measured by the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
(CPIA) ratings. The CPIA assessments are subjective ratings of 16 policy indicators,
grouped into 4 “clusters”, updated annually by World Bank staff.9 Possible scores on each
indicator range from one to six, including half-point increments (for example 3.5). For this
analysis, our main dependent variable is the simple average of CPIA clusters A and B,
which broadly reflects the so-called “Washington Consensus” neo-liberal policy prescrip-
tions (Williamson, 1994). Cluster A covers macroeconomic and debt policy, while cluster
B addresses structural policies, including trade, financial sector policies, and regulation of
private enterprise.10 The mean score of this CPIA-based policy quality indicator in our
sample is 3.61, with a standard deviation of 0.73.
The CPIA is arguably the most appropriate policy measure, because its content reflects
the views of World Bank management and staff regarding what policies are most conducive
to poverty reduction and the effective use of aid resources. Admittedly, there are prominent
skeptics of the development efficacy of neo-liberal policy prescriptions (see, for example,
Rodrik, 2006). The CPIA criteria may be seen as representing only one particular view
on what constitutes sound economic policy, and the policy prescriptions reflected in these
ratings may not necessarily lead to the desired outcomes of growth and poverty reduction.
Regardless of any perceived deficiencies in the CPIA’s content, it is the most relevant
available cross-country indicator of the policies World Bank country teams are attempting
to achieve when they design DPLs.
The CPIA indicators reflect the subjective judgments of World Bank staff. However,
they are correlated with conceptually-related objective indicators, as well as with subjec-
tive indicators produced by other organizations. The CPIA cluster A and B average is
correlated in the expected direction with macroeconomic indicators such as inflation (r
= -0.12) or government debt (r = -0.43). It is also strongly correlated with the Interna-
tional Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) “economic risk” composite – an index including GDP
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per capita, real GDP growth, annual inflation rate, budget balance and current account
balance as components (see the corresponding figure in the online appendix).
In robustness tests we supplement the CPIA with alternative measures of neoliberal
economic policies from the Fraser Institute and Heritage Foundation.11 Replicating results
for these alternative dependent variables is useful for two reasons. First, it shows that
the CPIA does not represent a particularly idiosyncratic World Bank view of what good
policies look like. On the contrary, there is quite a bit of conceptual overlap with the
Fraser and Heritage “economic freedom” indexes. Similarly to the CPIA’s four “clusters”,
Fraser’s Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index groups indicators into five policy
“areas”: size of government, secure property rights, access to sound money, freedom to
trade internationally, and regulation of credit, labor and business. The Heritage’s Index
of Economic Freedom covers ten components which are grouped in four categories: rule of
law, limited government, regulatory efficiency and open markets. Again, this categorization
closely resembles the subdivisions found in the CPIA. Empirically, there is also a close
match. The pairwise correlations for the year 2008 between CPIA and EFW, and CPIA
and Heritage, are 0.68 and 0.71 respectively.
A second reason to test our model with alternative dependent variables is to avoid
capturing any spurious correlation. Specifically, replicating our main results with the EFW
and Heritage indexes rules out the possibility that positive correlations between DPLs and
progress on economic policy reform are an artifact of CPIA ratings bias. The CPIA ratings
process for a given country involves numerous World Bank staff, potentially including those
involved in designing, approving or supervising DPLs to the country. Despite multiple
levels of reviews in the CPIA process, it is possible that country teams implementing a
DPL will have an over-optimistic view of the loan’s impact, and try to increase subsequent
CPIA ratings beyond what is justified by actual results. The Heritage and Fraser indicators
are immune to this potential bias. Note that our 2SLS tests, instrumenting for DPLs, will
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also correct for this potential bias, even when using CPIA as the dependent variable.
Another related variable is the measure on regulatory quality from the Worldwide
Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2010). It captures the ability of the government
to formulate and implement sound policies for private sector development. The correlation
with CPIA cluster B in our sample is high, 0.85. This variable also generates significant
results in a regression setting.12 However, we prefer using the economic freedom indexes
mentioned above as they conceptually cover CPIA cluster A and B, while WGI’s measure
only covers part of cluster B, that is, regulation of private enterprise.
Even if real improvements in policy are associated with DPLs, it is possible they would
have occurred anyway, even in the absence of the lending program. In the new operational
policy (OP 8.60), the basic rationale of a DPL is that the prospect of receiving a loan
motivates a government to implement a set of “prior actions” (policy conditions negotiated
with the Bank), and funds are then disbursed in anticipation of further reforms. One might
argue that improvements in policy (as measured by the CPIA) can result merely from a
government implementing a set of prior actions that were already planned or underway
before any discussion of a DPL began. However, prior actions tend to include “de jure”
reforms – such as passing a law or creating a new office – that would rarely be significant
enough to warrant an increase in a CPIA rating. Prior actions are usually designed to
represent a signal of commitment, or “first installment” in a larger package of reforms
supported by a DPL. The majority of completed DPLs are rated by the Bank’s Independent
Evaluation Group (IEG) as being successful in attaining their objectives, and a loan that
accomplishes nothing more than the implementation of its prior actions does not necessarily
receive a favorable rating.13 Our 2SLS and GMM tests correct for the possibility that
countries receiving DPLs might tend to be the same ones that would have reformed most
successfully even in the absence of a loan.
Following Easterly (2005), our key variable of interest is the cumulative number of
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policy loans. That is, we focus on repeated lending to the same country, since we believe
supporting policy change is a multistage and long term process. However, unlike Easterly
(2005), who included all development policy loans in his analyses of macroeconomic policy
distortions, we consider only the subset of loans that support policy reforms in the areas
measured by CPIA clusters A and B. These loans – which henceforth we will call “market
reform loans” – comprise less than sixty percent of the Bank’s total development policy
lending portfolio (see the corresponding table in the online appendix). Market reform loans
are not evenly distributed across countries: Ghana tops the list with a total of 17 loans (see
the corresponding figure in the online appendix). Among the countries that have received
at least one market reform loan, the median number of cumulative loans is four.
As an alternative to the cumulative number of DPLs, we also consider the number of
cumulative loan conditions (or “prior actions”).14 Again, we count only the conditions re-
lated to the content of CPIA clusters A and B. Argentina is clearly an outlying observation
(see the corresponding figure in the online appendix), with a total of 336 market reform
conditions, mostly from the World Bank’s involvement in Argentina’s large-scale economic
reforms during the 1990s and early 2000s (see, for example, Bambaci et al., 2002). We test
the effect of conditions on policy reform both with and without this outlier in the sample.
3.2. Model specifications
Econometrically, we estimate the following equation:
yi,t = β0 + β1Xi,t + β2Zi,t + δi + i,t (1)
where yit is the average of CPIA cluster A and B for country i in year t. Xit represents
the cumulative number of market reform loans (or conditions) for country i in year t.
For both variables, we estimate a linear effect, but also specified a model with diminishing
returns as well as a quadratic relation.15 Zit is a vector of control variables. Aid from other
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donors could have direct or indirect effects on policy reform, so we include total aid over
GDP as a control variable. Following Besley and Persson (2011) among other studies,
we include a measure of democracy, specifically the Freedom House index of political
freedoms.16 We include a time trend, to control for any secular improvements in economic
policy independent of any impact of World Bank loans, and for any potential tendency for
inflation over time in CPIA ratings. To correct for the possibility that policy quality may
be inferred in part from performance, we control for the logarithm of GDP per capita. δi are
country fixed effects. Descriptive statistics for these variables are presented in the online
appendix. We estimate the coefficients of this model by employing OLS on a comprehensive
country-year panel of aid recipient countries that runs from 1995 to 2008. Standard errors
are adjusted for country clustering of observations.
Because number of loans and conditions are continuous variables, we correct for sample
selection using instrumental variables techniques as in Easterly (2005) rather than Heck-
man selection models. We use two alternative methods. First, we estimate equation 1 with
system GMM (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) and instrument our
variables of interest with their lagged differenced values.17 The Arellano and Bond (1991)
tests indicate the presence of substantial autocorrelation: though we can reject serial cor-
relation in differences at the five percent level from AR(5) onwards, the p-values for AR(7)
and AR(9) are respectively 0.059 and 0.089 with the number of cumulative loans as the
key independent variable. For the number of conditions variable, the p-value drops below
the five percent level for AR(7) to 0.036. Hence, we lag our variables of interest to the
highest extent possible, that is, 15 periods. Furthermore, as the number of time periods
grows large, the instrument count increases exponentially, making results about estimators
and related specification tests invalid (Roodman, 2009). One solution to this problem is to
use only certain lags. Thus, we limit the number of lags per time period to one. In order
to minimize correlation across countries in the idiosyncratic errors, we also include time
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dummies instead of a time trend.18
The validity of this identification strategy rests on the assumption that E(∆xi,t−j(δi +
i,t)) = 0, which implies that changes in the receipt of policy loans are uncorrelated with
the fixed effects. According to the Diff-in-Hansen tests reported in table 6, these addi-
tional moment conditions are met. Next, system GMM estimators may suffer from weak
instrument biases (Bun and Windmeijer, 2010). Unfortunately, there are no formal tests
available to evaluate instrument strength. Hence, we assume that the internal instruments
used here are sufficiently strong to identify the effect of policy lending on the quality of
policies.
Given the restricted assumptions required for system GMM, we use a cross-sectional
version of the dataset and employ 2SLS as a second correction for possible selection bias.19
We estimate the following cross-sectional equation:
∆yi,t = γ0 + γ1yi,t0 + γ2∆Xˆi,t + γ3Zi,. + υi (2)
The dependent variable here is the change in policy quality, measured over the period
1996-2008.20 A convenient implication of using the change in policy quality as the depen-
dent variable is that time-invariant heterogeneity between countries – for example, colonial
heritage, legal tradition, and cultural norms – should matter relatively little, as most of its
effects will arguably be captured by the initial level of policy quality.
Key independent variables are the logarithm of the number of cumulative market reform
loans (or conditions) from 1996 through 2008. In the first stage we instrument for number
of loans or conditions with the logarithm of population in 1996 and the average fraction
of key votes in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) aligned with the G-7 over the period
1995-2008. Population size is used as an instrument for aid in many other researches
(for example, Boone, 1996; Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Djankov et al., 2008) and has
14
been shown to be statistically unrelated with a wide variety of institutional indicators
(Rose, 2006). However, its use is not without problems, especially when economic growth
is the dependent variable. Most notably, Bazzi and Clemens (2013) argue that country
size may affect growth through multiple (endogenous) channels – trade, FDI, aid, . . . –
which turns population as an instrument invalid when those factors are omitted or not
properly instrumented for. The fact that many empirical studies have used population
as an instrument for some endogenous variable without including other channels confirms
their point. Yet, where the quality of policies – that is, how policies are designed and not
the actual policy outcomes – is concerned, their conjecture is less obvious and without much
empirical support. Obviously, it is possible that orthogonality conditions are not met, even
though test statistics for overidentification are reassuring. As a second instrument we use
the average fraction of key votes in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) aligned with the
G-7. Here we follow, among others, Barro and Lee (2005) and Kilby (2013), who draw
on the literature that examines the influence of powerful nations on IFI decision making.
This line of research has convincingly shown that important donors use IFI resources to
seek support of strategically relevant countries. Again, for the instrument to be valid, we
assume that UN voting decisions are not directly related to the economic policies countries
opt for.
As controls we include the initial level of policy quality, average annual aid as a share
of GDP, and average annual growth in GDP per capita over the period 1996-2008, the
logarithm of initial income per capita, a measure for ethnic fractionalization (Alesina et al.,
1999; Collier, 2000), initial political freedom and the change in political freedom over the
period 1996-2008. See the online appendix for descriptive statistics. The coefficients of
equation 2 are estimated using 126 observations, one for each country for which CPIA
data are available from both 1996 and 2008. In the next section we discuss our empirical
findings.
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4. Empirical Findings
4.1. Baseline results and spillovers
Table 1 presents the results for the number of market reform loans. Number of loans is
significantly related to policy quality in each of the three specifications – linear, quadratic
and logarithmic. In the linear specification (table 1, equation 1), each additional market
reform loan is estimated to increase the CPIA score by .07 on average. Results for the
quadratic model imply that the maximum improvement in CPIA (relative to the case of
no DPLs) is about 0.90, corresponding to the case of 13 loans. For the logarithmic spec-
ification, a first loan increases the CPIA score by 0.40 points on average, and a second
loan by 0.21 points. However, the reported goodness-of-fit measures suggest that the log-
arithmic specification is most appropriate. Furthermore, both the J-test and Cox-Pesaran
test for non-nested models indicate that the model with positive but diminishing returns
to more DPLs better fits the data than the linear and quadratic models.21 The graphical
output of a semiparametric estimation – see figure 2 – further confirms the choice of the
logarithmic model. For space considerations, we will therefore report only the findings of
the logarithmic model in subsequent regressions when the number of loans is the main
variable of interest. Table 1 also reports a significant negative time trend over the 1995
to 2008 period. Higher per capita income and higher aid/GDP are associated with better
economic policies. Political freedoms are not significant, perhaps in part due to limited
variation in the data over time for many countries, coupled with the inclusion of country
fixed effects.
Table 2 reports findings for the number of cumulative conditions. The first equation
presents the results from estimating the quadratic specification using the full sample. A
highly significant concave relation appears, with a predicted turning point at 149 cumula-
tive conditions - equal to three times the average number in our sample, and two standard
deviations above the mean. However, figure 1 – the partial residual plot for the number of
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cumulative conditions – suggests that Argentina is a highly influential case in estimating
this relationship. Without Argentina in the sample (table 2, equation 3), the coefficient on
number of conditions squared declines and is no longer significant at conventional levels.
The estimated turning point drops from 149 to 20 cumulative conditions. Because Ar-
gentina is an extreme outlying and influential observation (in the quadratic specification),
we drop it from the sample in subsequent tests.
Equations 2 and 4 of table 2 show that the coefficient for the number of cumulative
conditions is positive and significant in both the linear and logarithmic specifications.
According to equation 2, one additional market reform condition increases the CPIA score
for the typical country by 0.04 points. The logarithmic model predicts that the first market
reform condition increases the CPIA score by 0.11 points on average. Table 2 also shows
that control variables behave in similar fashion as in table 1: income and aid are positively
associated with policy quality, and controlling for other variables there is a significant
negative time trend. Concerning model fit, neither the reported goodness-of-fit measures,
nor the J or Cox-Pesaran test, nor the semiparametric estimation (see figure 3) provide
robust indications which specification has the best fit. For the number of cumulative
conditions, we thus report all three specifications for most tests.
Next, we also check whether the implementation of market reform programs has “crowded
out” policy improvements in other areas. We do so by substituting the CPIA social policy
(CPIA C) and public sector governance (CPIA D) cluster averages for clusters A and B
as dependent variables. A priori, there are reasons to expect negative spillovers on other
policy areas. For instance, improving policy in one sector might divert rent-seeking activ-
ities to other sectors. Also, focusing on one policy area could attract human capital and
other resources from other sectors, reducing the ability to design and implement adequate
policies in those sectors. On the other hand, new rules and norms of behavior in one part
of the public sector might transplant to other departments or agencies (see, for example,
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Banerjee, 1992; Mullainathan, 2006). Thus we might also expect some “crowding in” of
reforms, that is, positive spillovers. Table 3 however shows that neither loans nor con-
ditions designed to improve policies related to clusters A and B have any significant net
impact on CPIA cluster C or cluster D. Coefficient signs in the CPIA C regressions are
consistent with positive spillovers, but p-values are above conventional significance levels.
Coefficient signs are mixed in the CPIA D regressions, and none come close to significance.
One possible explanation for the lack of (positive) spillovers is the length of the governance
results chain. That is, while improvements in cluster A and B are often characterized by
a short chain from inputs to outputs - for example, “stroke-of-the-pen” reforms such as
reduction in trade tariffs - the governance results chain in other areas, such as tackling
corruption, is much longer and thus harder to influence (World Bank, 2013).
4.2. Sample restrictions, additional controls and alternative dependent variables
In this subsection, we conduct several robustness checks. First, we employ two sample
restrictions. We follow Easterly (2005) in limiting the sample to include only countries
that have received at least one economic policy loan over the period 1980-2010. With this
change, about one sixth of observations (and countries) are dropped. Selection bias should
be reduced – but not eliminated entirely – in this more homogeneous sample. As equation
1 of table 4 shows, the coefficient on (the log of) the cumulative number of loans remains
positive and highly significant, although it is somewhat smaller in magnitude than in table
1, equation 3. As shown in the first row of table 5, the number of conditions remains
significant only in the linear specification.
As an alternative sample restriction, we drop all observations for a country after the
last market reform loan to that country has closed.22 About one third of observations
are dropped with this change. If reforms associated with DPLs are often not sustained
following completion of the loan, then the estimated effects should increase when the
years following loan closing are dropped. Equation 2 of table 4 indicates that the impact
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of economic policy lending is slightly higher, with similar significance levels, with this
restriction (.444, compared to .406). Coefficients are also slightly larger for the number of
cumulative conditions, as shown in the second row of table 5. Although the coefficients
decline in magnitude only slightly with this sample restriction, these patterns are consistent
with the conjecture that there is some backsliding of reforms after the loans are fully
disbursed.
Next, we test whether results are robust to including additional controls. Chauvet
and Collier (2009) find that elections matter for economic policy and distinguish between
the frequency effect of elections and the cyclical effect of elections. Dreher et al. (2009)
hypothesize that debt incurred in the run up to elections will increase the likelihood of a
World Bank loan, but show empirically that World Bank loans are actually less frequent
in the wake of an election. We therefore add a measure of elections frequency, a variable
that captures the stage of the political business cycle, and a dummy for lagged elections.
We include debt service, as it is found to affect the number of World Bank projects a
country receives (Dreher et al., 2009). We also add a dummy variable coded 1 if a country
signed an agreement with the IMF. Finally, we include (the log of) population, with no
theoretical prior but simply to control for possible economies or dis-economies of scale in
policy reform. Inclusion of these variables may correct for any omitted variable bias. We
also control for gross IDA disbursements, as a correction for one potential source of reverse
causation. Countries with higher CPIA ratings receive higher allocations of IDA aid, other
things equal, which in turn may increase the likelihood of receiving a DPL. Because any
causal effect of CPIA ratings on DPLs is mediated by IDA disbursements, controlling for
the latter will effectively correct for this potential source of endogeneity bias. In the next
subsection we will treat endogeneity concerns in a more general way. Equation 3 of table
4 shows that the (log of the) number of cumulative market reform loans remains positively
and significantly related to the quality of economic policy. The coefficient magnitude (.331)
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is reduced somewhat, but it is not directly comparable to equation 3 of table 1, because
missing data on some of the additional control variables reduces the sample by nearly one
third. Among the added control variables, only IDA volumes are significant: as expected,
they are positively related to CPIA ratings. As shown in the third row of table 5, with
these additional controls the coefficient for the number of cumulative conditions remains
positive and highly significant in the linear specification.
As CPIA ratings are produced within the World Bank, one might argue that results
could be driven by spurious correlation, for example if CPIA scores for a country are
inflated to justify more lending in general, and/or to justify providing loans in the form of
budget support. For this reason, we show that our main results are robust to using two
alternative dependent variables, from the “economic freedom” indexes developed by the
Fraser Institute and the Heritage Foundation. For both variables, we aggregate certain
subindices to correspond as closely as possible to the questions in CPIA clusters A and B.
Equations 4 and 5 of table 4 show that we again find a significantly positive effect of World
Bank lending on the quality of economic policy.23 Number of conditions has a positive
and significant coefficient in both the linear and logarithmic specifications for the Fraser
Institute index, as shown in the fourth row of table 5. For the Heritage Foundation index
(last row of table 5), the quadratic specification provides the best fit between number of
conditions and quality of economic policy. The maximum increase in the Heritage index (by
8 points, or nearly one standard deviation) is estimated to occur at 127 conditions. Beyond
254 conditions, policy lending becomes detrimental, relative to the case of no conditions
at all. In our data set only 17 out of the 117 countries that received at least one market
reform condition lie beyond the predicted turning point. World Bank conditionality was
detrimental for only one country (Argentina), according to this specification.
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4.3. Endogeneity of policy lending
In this subsection we provide a more general correction for endogeneity of policy lending
in two different ways. First, we correct for endogeneity by employing system GMM in
the panel dataset. Because the Arellano and Bond (1991) tests indicate the presence of
substantial autocorrelation, we lag our variables of interest to the highest extent possible,
that is, 15 periods. Furthermore, in order to limit the total number of instruments, we
select a lag range of one. Results are presented in table 6. For comparability, we only report
the findings of the logarithmic model.24 Coefficients are positive and significant for both
the number of loans (equation 1) and the number of conditions (equation 2). Furthermore,
test statistics presented at the bottom of table 6 are reassuring. The p-values of the Hansen
J statistic do not reject the null that instruments are exogenous. The values reported for
the Diff-in-Hansen test provide an indication whether the additional moment restrictions
necessary for system GMM are met (Bond et al., 2001). With p-values of around 0.45 for
both variables, we do not reject the null that the additional moment conditions are valid.
As a second robustness test, we employ 2SLS and estimate equation 2 in a cross-
sectional version of the data. With the panel dataset, we are limited to using mechanical
instruments in GMM, because substantive instruments that significantly predict DPLs
exhibit little or no time series variation. Moving to cross section data allows us to avoid
that problem. The dependent variable here is the change in CPIA cluster A and B, and the
endogenous regressor is the logarithm of the number of cumulative loans (or conditions),
both measured over 1996 to 2008. In the first stage we instrument for number of DPLs (or
conditions) with (the log of) population (in 1996) and the average fraction of the country’s
key votes in the UNGA that are aligned with the votes of G-7 countries over the period
1995-2008 (Barro and Lee, 2005; Kilby, 2011). We expect larger countries, and allies of
major donors, to receive more DPLs. We assume neither variable directly affects quality
of economic policies; note population was not significant when added as a control variable
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to equation 3 of table 4.
Results for OLS and 2SLS regressions are reported in tables 7 and 8. Equation 1, table
7 shows that the effect of loans on changes in policy quality is positive and statistically
significant. Furthermore, the coefficient for initial level of policy quality is significantly
negative, implying a regression toward the mean effect. Both the initial level of political
rights and its change over the period are associated with improved policy quality25. This
finding is consistent with Svensson (2003) and Heckelman and Knack (2008), but incon-
sistent with other studies suggesting that democratic institutions might actually hamper
reform (see, for example, Alesina and Drazen, 1991; Rodrik, 1996). Equations 2 and 3
present the results from 2SLS estimation. Equation 2 shows first-stage results. Popula-
tion and UN voting are both highly significant predictors of more loans. The F-statistic
of excluded instruments is 19.12, which indicates a strong association of our instruments
with the receipt of World Bank DPLs. Furthermore, Wooldridge (1995)’s robust score test
of overidentifying restrictions does not reject the null that the excluded instruments are
exogenous to the quality of policy (test score = 0.21, p-value = 0.64). In equation 3, the
exogenous effect of policy lending is reported. The coefficient on loans more than triples
in comparison with its OLS counterpart, suggesting that the net effect of endogeneity bias
was negative. The 2SLS regression confirms the regression toward the mean effect. In ad-
dition, both the initial income level and income growth now have a positive and significant
effect on changes in policy.
Table 8 presents the 2SLS results when the number of cumulative conditions is substi-
tuted for number of loans as the key regressor. Again, regression diagnostics support our
identification strategy. The first-stage F-statistic is 27, and the p-value for the overidenti-
fication test is .906. As table 8 shows, findings are similar to results in table 7. The OLS
coefficient on log of conditions is positive and highly significant (equation 1), but it nearly
triples in magnitude when we instrument for conditions with initial population and UNGA
22
voting. The coefficient on initial CPIA is again negative and statistically significant, im-
plying that, on average, countries with greater initial policy quality tend to improve less
over time. Furthermore, estimates suggest that increasing political rights improves eco-
nomic policy. The 2SLS regression also confirms that economic policy improvements are
associated with high initial income and income growth.
5. Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this study we investigate the impact of World Bank policy loans on the quality of
economic policy, correcting for several methodological problems and allowing for the pos-
sibility of increasing or decreasing returns to additional loans or conditions. We find that
policy lending has a positive but diminishing effect on the quality of economic policy. Re-
sults are robust to sample restrictions, additional controls, the use of alternative indicators
of the quality of economic policy, and correction for endogeneity with system GMM and
cross-sectional 2SLS. Similar results are generally obtained when we substitute the number
of cumulative conditions for the number of cumulative loans, although in this case no one
functional form consistently best fits the data. There is some evidence for negative returns
to additional conditions beyond some point, but the estimated inflection point is highly
sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of Argentina in the sample. The average number
of conditions in DPLs declined from about 35 in the 1980s to about 12 by 2005, and our
results provide some support for the Bank’s decision to make conditionality less onerous.
Finally, we investigate the possibility of spillover effects on other policy areas, and show
that investing in economic policy reform does not significantly affect policy quality for
good or ill in the areas of public sector governance, and human development, social policy,
and environmental policy.
Our main results are in contrast with most of the research examining the effectiveness
of adjustment lending. Although there are many differences in data and methodology that
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could explain this discrepancy, four of them are particularly worthy of note. First, esti-
mating the impact of development policy lending calls for a sound identification strategy.
However, many of the early studies employed a before-after analysis or a with-without
approach using strong but dubious assumptions. In contrast, our study relied on instru-
mental variables techniques to obtain identification. Second, our analysis distinguished
among the policy targets of DPLs – many of them target sectoral policies, not economic
policies. Failing to make this distinction can produce a downward bias in the estimated
impact of lending on policy reform. In this respect, our study is similar in spirit to Clemens
et al. (2012), who show that aid’s estimated impact on short-run growth strengthens when
humanitarian and other components of aid are excluded that are not intended to further
short-run growth. Third, instead of looking at final outcome measures such as economic
growth – for which aid might only represent a weak signal (Roodman, 2007) – we take as
the dependent variable what World Bank country teams are attempting to achieve when
they design DPLs, that is, the quality of development policies. And finally, the time period
under investigation is different. Most research evaluates the first two decades of adjustment
lending. However, as mentioned in section 2 the practice of development policy lending
evolved substantially over time, particularly since the end of the 1990s.
The more positive results in our study suggest that the World Bank’s claims about
learning from its mistakes with traditional adjustment lending have some validity. Fur-
thermore, even though we do not look at economic growth directly, there is good reason to
believe that the policy reforms the World Bank supports stimulate development.26 Con-
sequently, finding that the Bank’s key lending instrument for improving economic policies
appears to be effective is important for its twin goals of ending extreme poverty and stim-
ulating shared prosperity.
Finally, our analysis considered only policy lending conducted by the World Bank. We
would welcome similar studies of aid programs intended to promote policy reform, by the
24
regional development banks, the European Union or large bilateral donors, using their own
internal datasets where available.
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Figure 1: partial residual plot of number of cumulative conditions based on equation 1, table 2, with
Argentina included
Figure 2: Non-parametric fit of cumulative loans
Note: semiparametric fixed-effects regression using STATA’s xtsemipar command with CPIA cluster A and B average as
dependent variable, log of per capita GDP, aid over GDP, political rights and a time trend as parameterized variables and
cumulative loans as non parameterized variable. Polynomial of degree two fitted. Standard errors clustered by country.
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Figure 3: Non-parametric fit of cumulative conditions
Note: semiparametric fixed-effects regression using STATA’s xtsemipar command with CPIA cluster A and B average as
dependent variable, log of per capita GDP, aid over GDP, political rights and a time trend as parameterized variables and
cumulative conditions as non parameterized variable. Polynomial of degree two fitted. Standard errors clustered by country.
Argentina excluded from the sample.
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Table 1: panel regression of CPIA clusters A and B average on cumulative loans
equation no. (1) (2) (3)
number of cumulative loans .073 .134 .
(.023)∗∗∗ (.047)∗∗∗
number of cumulative loans (squared) . -.005 .
(.003)∗
log of number of cumulative loans . . .406
(.112)∗∗∗
year -.023 -.024 -.026
(.008)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗
log GDP per capita (PPP) .805 .799 .814
(.152)∗∗∗ (.149)∗∗∗ (.148)∗∗∗
aid over GDP 1.618 1.577 1.512
(.531)∗∗∗ (.519)∗∗∗ (.515)∗∗∗
Political Rights -.016 -.015 -.011
(.021) (.021) (.021)
country fixed effects yes yes yes
Observations 1761 1761 1761
Countries 139 139 139
R2 .134 .139 .147
Adjusted R2 .131 .137 .144
AIC 1113.115 1103.17 1086.232
BIC 1140.483 1136.012 1113.601
Note: * significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.
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Table 2: panel regression of CPIA clusters A and B average on cumulative conditions
equation no. (1) (2) (3) (4)
variation quad.+Arg. linear quad log
number of cumulative conditions .010 .004 .007 .
(.003)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗
number of cumulative conditions (squared) -.00003 . -.00002 .
(.00001)∗∗∗ (.00001)
log of number of cumulative conditions . . . .111
(.061)∗
year -.018 -.017 -.018 -.016
(.008)∗∗ (.008)∗∗ (.008)∗∗ (.008)∗∗
log GDP per capita (PPP) .807 .792 .794 .816
(.155)∗∗∗ (.154)∗∗∗ (.154)∗∗∗ (.158)∗∗∗
aid over GDP 1.697 1.682 1.690 1.689
(.520)∗∗∗ (.535)∗∗∗ (.526)∗∗∗ (.521)∗∗∗
Political Rights -.016 -.019 -.016 -.016
(.021) (.021) (.021) (.021)
country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Observations 1761 1748 1748 1748
Countries 139 138 138 138
R2 .14 .124 .127 .123
Adjusted R2 .137 .122 .124 .12
AIC 1102.59 1090.29 1085.58 1092.87
BIC 1135.43 1117.46 1118.38 1120.12
Note: * significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%. Argentina excluded from the sample for
equations (2) through (4).
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Table 3: spillover effects on other policy areas
dependent variable CPIA C CPIA D
log of number of cumulative loans
.153 .103
(.114) (.088)
cumulative conditions, linear spec.
.0005 -.0003
(.001) (.001)
cumulative conditions, quadratic spec.
.001 -.0004
(.004) (.004)
-.000003 .0000005
(.00002) (.00002)
cumulative conditions, logarithmic spec.
.037 -.024
(.058) (.052)
Note: Regression results from estimating equation 1 with CPIA C and CPIA D as dependent variables. CPIA cluster C
average measures the quality of policies for social inclusion and equity and CPIA cluster D average measures the quality of
policies for public sector governance. Only coefficient estimates and clustered standard errors of loans and conditions
variables reported. Argentina excluded from the sample when the number of conditions is used as variable of interest.
When the number of loans is used as variable of interest, 1761 observations are used covering 139 countries. When the
number of conditions is used as variable of interest, 1748 observations are used covering 138 countries.
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Table 4: robustness tests: cumulative loans
variation DPL>0 closing year controls EFW Heritage
equation no. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log of number of cumulative loans .341 .444 .331 .394 2.623
(.115)∗∗∗ (.127)∗∗∗ (.129)∗∗ (.134)∗∗∗ (1.413)∗
year -.018 -.039 -.036 .045 -.130
(.009)∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.019)∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.101)
log GDP per capita (PPP) .727 .980 .899 .442 12.193
(.148)∗∗∗ (.260)∗∗∗ (.263)∗∗∗ (.204)∗∗ (2.566)∗∗∗
aid over GDP 1.564 1.458 2.019 1.961 -34.705
(.556)∗∗∗ (.576)∗∗ (.706)∗∗∗ (.973)∗∗ (11.410)∗∗∗
Political Rights -.008 -.012 .010 -.079 -.751
(.021) (.026) (.021) (.042)∗ (.358)∗∗
log of gross IDA . . .077 . .
(.023)∗∗∗
IMF arrangement . . -.022 . .
(.025)
debt service (% of GNI) . . -.004 . .
(.004)
log of population . . .941 . .
(.734)
lagged election . . -.009 . .
(.019)
election cycle . . -.011 . .
(.014)
election frequency . . .008 . .
(.010)
country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1443 1182 1235 1040 1607
Countries 114 121 105 95 132
R2 .143 .136 .191 .547 .195
Note: Panel regression results from several robustness tests. Dependent variable: CPIA clusters A and B average. Variable
of interest: (log of) number of cumulative market reform loans. * significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance
at 1%. Standard errors clustered by country.
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Table 5: robustness tests: cumulative conditions
robustness test linear quadratic logarithmic
DPL>0 .002 . .
(.001)∗
. .006 .
(.003)∗
. -.00002 .076
(.00002) (.060)
closing year .004 . .
(.001)∗∗∗
. .008 .
(.003)∗∗
. -.00002 .119
(.00002) (.068)∗
controls .005 . .
(.002)∗∗∗
. .009 .
(.004)∗∗∗
. -.00002 .126
(.00002) (.078)
EFW .007 . .
(.002)∗∗∗
. .008 .
(.004)∗
. -.000006 .096
(.00002) (.057)∗
Heritage .031 . .
(.020)
. .127 .
(.049)∗∗∗
. -.0005 .757
(.0002)∗∗ (.766)
Note: Panel regression results from several robustness tests. Dependent variable: CPIA clusters A and B average. Variable
of interest: number of cumulative market reform conditions. Only coefficient estimates and clustered standard errors of
conditions variable are reported. * significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%. Argentina excluded
from the sample. Taking into account the exclusion of Argentina, observations and number of countries are similar to table
4.
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Table 6: System GMM
equation no. (1) (2)
log of number of cumulative loans .194 .
(.091)∗∗
log of number of cumulative conditions . .090
(.043)∗∗
log GDP per capita (PPP) .221 .219
(.063)∗∗∗ (.062)∗∗∗
aid over GDP -1.089 -.947
(.528)∗∗ (.572)∗
Political Rights -.104 -.106
(.027)∗∗∗ (.027)∗∗∗
country fixed effects yes yes
year fixed effects yes yes
Observations 1761 1748
Countries 139 138
Number of instruments 44 44
Wald statistic 159.88 153.02
p-value 0.0001 0.0001
Hansen J-test 23.10 25.01
p-value 0.627 0.518
Diff-in-Hansen test 13.99 13.89
p-value 0.45 0.451
Note: Dependent variable: CPIA cluster A and B average. For equation (1), the log of the number of cumulative loans is
the variable of interest. For equation (2), the log of the number of cumulative conditions is the variable of interest.
Cluster-robust standard errors are reported. Coefficients estimated with forward orthogonal deviations and level equations
for IV style instruments. * significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%. Argentina excluded from the
sample when the number of conditions is used as variable of interest.
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Table 7: cross-sectional 2SLS number of loans
equation no. (1) (2) (3)
OLS First stage Second Stage
log of cumulative loans 1996-2008 .224 . .770
(.065)∗∗∗ (.175)∗∗∗
CPIA 1996 -.586 .061 -.636
(.063)∗∗∗ (.088) (.075)∗∗∗
average annual GDP per capita growth .016 .0002 .018
(.009)∗ (.005) (.008)∗∗
log of GDP per capita 1996 .076 -.210 .256
(.056) (.079)∗∗∗ (.087)∗∗∗
ethnic fractionalization .124 .013 .068
(.176) (.228) (.205)
Political Rights 1996 -.058 -.056 -.011
(.029)∗∗ (.040) (.038)
change in Political Rights -.102 -.071 -.043
(.033)∗∗∗ (.047) (.042)
average annual aid over GDP -1.635 1.840 .386
(1.081) (1.969) (1.295)
log of 1996 population . .160 .
(.041)∗∗∗
average fraction of votes with G-7 . .896 .
(.358)∗∗
No. observations 126 126 126
R2 .552 .347 .261
F test of excluded instruments . 19.1276 .
p-value . 0.00001 .
test of endogeneity . . 13.2256
p-value . . 0.0003
Overidentification test . . 0.2125
p-value . . 0.6449
Note: Dependent variable is the change in policy quality over the period 1996-2008, as measured by the CPIA cluster A
and B average. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.
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Table 8: cross-sectional 2SLS number of conditions
equation no. (1) (2) (3)
OLS First stage Second Stage
log of cumulative conditions 1996-2008 .097 . .274
(.027)∗∗∗ (.057)∗∗∗
CPIA 1996 -.588 .146 -.630
(.062)∗∗∗ (.220) (.068)∗∗∗
average annual GDP per capita growth .016 .003 .017
(.009)∗ (.012) (.007)∗∗
log of GDP per capita 1996 .047 -.160 .129
(.053) (.195) (.066)∗∗
ethnic fractionalization .120 .086 .070
(.177) (.571) (.200)
Political Rights 1996 -.063 -.048 -.035
(.029)∗∗ (.093) (.033)
change in Political Rights -.118 .031 -.103
(.033)∗∗∗ (.112) (.037)∗∗∗
average annual aid over GDP -1.706 7.420 -.316
(1.126) (5.021) (1.289)
log of 1996 population . .419 .
(.096)∗∗∗
average fraction of votes with G-7 . 2.963 .
(.847)∗∗∗
No. observations 126 126 126
R2 .56 .331 .368
F test of excluded instruments . 27.0558 .
p-value . 0.00001 .
test of endogeneity . . 12.8265
p-value . . 0.0003
Overidentification test . . .141
p-value . . 0.906
Note: Dependent variable is the change in policy quality over the period 1996-2008, as measured by the CPIA cluster A
and B average. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.
Argentina excluded from the sample.
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Appendices
Appendix A. Descriptive Statistics, variable definitions and sources
Table A.1: Summary statistics panel model
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
CPIA cluster A and B average 3.613 0.73 1 5.850
CPIA cluster C 3.422 0.700 1 6
CPIA cluster D 3.226 0.717 1 5.5
EFW 6.313 1.026 2.027 8.932
Heritage 60.09 9.591 20.833 88.183
number of cumulative loans 2.86 2.763 0 16
number of cumulative conditions 50.368 49.784 0 210
year 2001.646 3.883 1995 2008
log GDP per capita (PPP) 7.981 1.018 5.076 10.352
aid over GDP 0.042 0.064 -0.019 0.806
Political Rights 3.777 1.989 1 7
log of gross IDA (current million USD) 2.31 2.26 0 8.311
arrangement with IMF 0.15 0.357 0 1
debt service (% of GNI) 5.021 6.28 0.053 138.888
log of population 15.926 1.756 11.515 20.854
election 0.194 0.396 0 1
election cycle 1.841 2.513 0 24
election frequency 5.151 2.202 1 22
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Table A.2: Summary statistics cross-sectional model
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
change in CPIA cluster A and B 0.046 0.661 -1.731 1.819
log of cumulative loans 1996-2008 .8286652 .7132909 0 2.30259
log of cumulative conditions 1996-2008 2.091848 1.694547 0 4.82831
CPIA A and B 1996 3.699 0.856 1 5.231
average annual GDP per capita growth 4.770 8.168 -2.486 82.035
log of GDP per capita 1996 6.834 1.168 4.191 9.031
ethnic fractionalization 0.473 0.252 0 0.930
Political Rights 1996 3.738 2.06 1 7
change in Political Rights -0.079 1.312 -5 3
average annual aid over GDP 0.035 0.045 0 0.277
log of population 1996 15.588 1.958 10.618 20.92
average fraction of votes with G-7 0.478 0.203 0.113 0.943
Figure A.4: linear association between CPIA cluster A and B average and ICRG’s Economic Risk Com-
posite
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Table A.3: sectoral distribution of all effective adjustment loans for the period 1980-2010
sector frequency percentage
Market Reform Loans
Economic Policy 450 44.91
Financial and Private Sector Development 121 12.08
Financial Sector 12 1.2
Private Sector Development 7 0.7
Other DPLs
Agriculture and Rural Development 62 6.19
Education 29 2.89
Energy and Mining 46 4.59
Environment 14 1.4
Public Financial Management 1 0.1
Global Information/Communications Techn 2 0.2
Health, Nutrition and Population 8 0.8
Poverty Reduction 51 5.09
Public Sector Governance 127 12.67
Social Development 2 0.2
Social Protection 49 4.89
Transport 5 0.5
Urban Development 14 1.4
Water 2 0.2
Total 1,002 100
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Figure A.5: distribution of cumulative loans for the period 1980-2010
Figure A.6: distribution of cumulative conditions for the period 1980-2010
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Appendix B. Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
The CPIA scores are designed to measure government policies and institutions, rather
than outcomes. The set of criteria are revised periodically to reflect changes in the collec-
tive knowledge of practitioners and specialists - both inside and outside the World Bank
– regarding policies and public sector management institutions that matter for these out-
comes. The criteria are grouped into 4 “clusters” as follows:
• A. Economic Management
1. Macroeconomic Management
2. Fiscal Policy
3. Debt Policy
• B. Structural Policies
4. Trade
5. Financial Sector
6. Business Regulatory Environment
• C. Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity
7. Gender Equality
8. Equity of Public Resource Use
9. Building Human Resources
10. Social Protection and Labor
11. Policies and Institutions for Environmental Sustainability
• D. Public Sector Management and Institutions
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12. Property Rights and Rule-based Governance
13. Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management
14. Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization
15. Quality of Public Administration
16. Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption in the Public Sector
For each criterion, countries are rated on a scale of 1 (low) to 6 (high). A 1 rating
corresponds to a very weak performance, and a 6 rating to a very strong performance.
Intermediate scores of 1.5, 2.5, 3.5, 4.5 and 5.5 may also be given. For the years 1995-1997,
countries were rated on a scale of 1 to 5. Scores have been rescaled for this research to a
scale of 1 to 6. See OPCS (2009) for a detailed elaboration of the scoring procedure.
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Appendix C. Additional System GMM regression
Table C.1: Additional System GMM regression
equation no. (1) (2)
log of number of cumulative loans .389 .
(.10)∗∗∗
log of number of cumulative conditions . .146
(.034)∗∗∗
log GDP per capita (PPP) .278 .251
(.054)∗∗∗ (.053)∗∗∗
aid over GDP -.485 -.481
(.524) (.510)
Political Rights -.089 -.099
(.025)∗∗∗ (.026)∗∗∗
country fixed effects yes yes
year fixed effects yes yes
Observations 1761 1748
Number of instruments 24 24
Wald statistic 194.05 178.86
p-value 0.0001 0.0001
Hansen J-test 7.31 5.77
p-value 0.293 0.449
Diff-in-Hansen test 0.66 2.73
p-value 0.417 0.10
Note: cluster-robust standard errors are reported. Coefficients estimated with forward orthogonal deviations and level
equations for IV style instruments. Collapsed instrument matrix. Lags 5 to 10 used for loans and 10 to 15 for conditions. *
significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%. Argentina excluded from the sample when the number of
conditions is used as variable of interest.
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Notes
1Ex-ante refers to the timing of disbursing conditional loan tranches. With ex-ante disbursement, loan
tranches are disbursed before conditions are met, while ex-post disbursement refers to disbursing funds
only after prior actions are met.
2World Bank (1989) lists five reasons of why early adjustment lending was so heavily criticized: i)
inadequate program design with limited focus on poverty reduction; ii) limited program implementation;
iii) programs based on unrealistic assumptions; iv) the weight of SAL on the Bank’s lending portfolio; and
v) lack of diplomacy and coordination among creditors.
3See Smets et al. (2013) for a recent quantitative analysis concerning the importance of design quality
on reform success.
4Joseph Stiglitz’s address at UNCTAD in 1998 – when he was the Bank’s Chief Economist – nicely
illustrates the shift in momentum. Consider, for example, the following quote: ‘The key ingredients
in a successful development strategy are ownership and participation. We have seen again and again
that ownership is essential for successful transformation: policies that are imposed from outside may be
grudgingly accepted on a superficial basis, but will rarely be implemented as intended [ . . . ]. Furthermore,
a country’s own development strategy provides, then, the overall framework for thinking about a country’s
plan for change’ (Stiglitz, 1998).
5This policy shift was formalized in 2004 in a new operational policy, OP 8.60, including the name
change from structural adjustment lending to development policy lending. Furthermore, in 2005 the
Bank’s Development Committee endorsed five good practice principles of policy based lending: country
ownership, harmonization with other donors, customization of lending design, criticality of loan conditions,
and transparency and predictability of performance. All new development policy operations should adhere
to these best practice principles.
6Jones et al. (2011) – examining the Bank’s support in bringing down tariffs in Eastern Africa – lies
somewhere in between as they investigate the period 1992-2002.
7Using a set of instruments, Kilby (2005) fails to reject exogeneity of World Bank lending. However, the
author points to the limitations of the available instruments and mentions that results should be treated
with caution.
8Of the five “economic freedom” sub-indexes, he uses only the one on government regulation of business,
credit and labor markets.
9See OPCS (2009) for a detailed description of the 16 indicators and the assessment procedure used to
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generate them.
10The CPIA overall goes well beyond the Washington Consensus, as cluster C address human develop-
ment and social and environmental policies, and cluster D covers public sector governance and institutions.
11See Gwartney et al. (2013) and Miller et al. (2013) for a detailed description of both indices. To provide
an even closer match with CPIA cluster A and B, we have dropped security of property rights from the
Fraser Institute’s index. For the Heritage score, we only retained the following components: openness to
trade, government spending, monetary policy, business freedom, investment freedom and financial freedom.
12Regression output is available upon request but left out due to space considerations.
13As an additional test we dropped from the sample all DPLs that were rated moderately unsatisfactory,
unsatisfactory or highly unsatisfactory. As expected, results from regressing the base model on this data
turn out more favorably, but are not included due to space considerations.
14Prior actions are the critical policy conditions that the borrowing goverment agrees to take for loan
tranches to be released. Arguably, some loan conditions may have a larger impact on policy quality than
others. Disaggregating conditions by type is beyond the scope of this study, but is an interesting issue for
future research.
15In order to retain the zero observations when making the log transformation, we added 1 to the number
of cumulative EP loans and to the number of cumulative prior actions. Results are not sensitive to the
specific values added for the log transformations.
16A referee suggested also to include Freedom House’s civil liberties as a control variable. Due to the
high correlation between political and civil liberties, 0.90 in our sample, results changed very little when
doing so. Output from these regressions is available upon request.
17System GMM is mainly used to estimate a dynamic panel model with a lagged dependent variable
on the right-hand side. However, it can also be used – as here – to lag endogenous regressors (Roodman,
2009).
18Alternative specifications – for example, collapsing the instrument matrix, increasing the number of
lags per time period, including different lags – generate equally significant coefficient estimates for both
loans and conditions, with acceptable test statistics for overidentification. See the online appendix for a
regression with a collapsed instrument matrix, using lags five to ten for loans and lags ten to fifteen for
conditions.
19With the panel dataset, we are limited to using mechanical instruments in GMM, because substantive
instruments that significantly predict DPLs exhibit little or no time series variation. Moving to cross-
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section data allows us to avoid that problem as well as complications associated with serial correlation in
the dependent variable.
20In order to maximize the number of observations, we took 1996 instead of 1995 as the base year.
21For instance, the J-test rejects the quadratic specification as the correct model, with a J-statistic of
2.01 with corresponding p-value of 0.046. It does not reject the logarithmic model (J-statistic = -0.61 with
p-value 0.54). Similarly, the linear model is rejected in favor of the logarithmic (J-statistic = 2.18, p-value
= 0.031), without rejecting the logarithmic model (J-statistic = - 0.10 with p-value = 0.981).
22Data on closing years of policy loans were extracted from a less comprehensive dataset.
23When the Fraser Institute index is included as the dependent variable, the time period under investi-
gation expands from 1995-2008 to 1980-2008. This might explain the positive time trend in equation 4 of
table 4.
24Other specifications generate similar results and are available upon request.
25“Political freedoms” varies from 1 (most democratic) to 7 (least democratic), so a negative coefficient
implies that more political freedoms are associated with higher CPIA ratings.
26Numerous studies have demonstrated the positive effects on growth and development of the macroeco-
nomic and structural policies reflected in CPIA clusters A and B. Some of the more widely-cited examples
include Barro (1991), Fischer (1993), King and Levine (1993), Sachs and Warner (1995), Frankel and
Romer (1999) and Burnside and Dollar (2000).
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